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INSURANCE AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES-The Public
Policy Rationale from an Alternative
Viewpoint-Anthony v. Frith, 394 So. 2d 867
(Miss. 1981)
Carol Ann Anthony was injured when struck by an automo-
bile as she was walking in a shopping center parking lot. The
driver of the automobile, Clayton Frith, was intoxicated at the
time. In a suit to recover for the personal injuries sustained by
Miss Anthony, a jury awarded a judgment against Frith for
$1,500 in compensatory damages and $3,500 in punitive
damages.'
Mr. Frith was insured by State Farm Mutual Automobile In-
surance Company under a typical automobile liability insurance
policy.2 State Farm proceeded to pay the compensatory damages
but refused to pay the portion of the judgment assessed as puni-
tive damages.' Miss Anthony obtained a writ of garnishment
against the insurer which was subsequently dismissed in circuit
court." The circuit judge ruled punitive damages were within the
coverage of the policy in question; however, public policy pre-
vented requiring the insurer to pay amounts assessed as punitive
damages.
The Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the lower court.
After first agreeing that punitive damages were covered by the
policy as issued,' the supreme court went on to hold that public
policy did not prohibit requiring the insurer to pay punitive
damages.
7
There is a split of authority among the jurisdictions that have
1. Anthony v. Frith, 394 So. 2d 867 (Miss. 1981).
2. The relevant portion of the policy provided:
COVERAGE A - BODILY INJURY LIABILITY
To pay on behalf of insured all sums which the insured shall become legally
obligated to pay as damages because of
(A) bodily injury sustained by other persons, and . . . caused by acci-
dent . . . (emphasis in policy).
Id. at 868.
3. Id. at 867-68.
4. Id. at 868.
5. Id.
6. Id. (emphasis added).
7. Id.
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considered the issue of the insurability of punitive damages.' The
Mississippi Supreme Court was first confronted with this issue in
the instant case. The ruling of the supreme court aligned Missis-
sippi with the jurisdictions that allow punitive damages to be re-
covered from an insurer. However, the supreme court adopted this
posture without fully disclosing its rationale.'
The purpose of this note is to present a brief comparison of
the opposing lines of.analysis and then to pursue a closer examina-
tion of the amorphous public policy rationale. The scope of this
note is limited to situations in which recovery is sought against a
tortfeasor for his own misdeeds.10
BACKGROUND
Punitive damages 1 are generally viewed as a class of money
damages awarded separate from and in addition to the actual or
compensatory damages sustained by an injured plaintiff."2 How-
ever, some jurisdictions view punitive damages as compensatory in
nature. In Connecticut, for instance, an award for punitive dam-
ages may not exceed the plaintiff's expense of litigation, less taxa-
ble costs.' 3 Punitive damages are also awarded to compensate the
8. See generally Comment, Punitive Damages and Liability Insurance: Theory, Re-
ality and Practicality, 9 CuM. L. REV. 487 (1978); Comment, Insurance for Punitive
Damages: A Reevaluation, 28 HASTINGS L. J. 431 (1976).
9. The court cited various authorities on both sides of the issue and summarily con-
cluded that allowing recovery of punitive damages from an insurer "in this case" was "the
better reasoned view." 394 So. 2d at 868.
10. Various other considerations become relevant when a plaintiff seeks recovery
from a party based upon vicarious liability. For a general discussion of insurance coverage
in the context of vicarious liability, see Comment, Insurance for Punitive Damages: A Re-
evaluation, 28 HASTINGS L. J. 431 (1976). See also Comment, Punitive Damages and
Liability Insurance: Theory, Reality and Practicality, 9 CuM. L. REV. 487, 500 (1978).
11. Punitive damages are also known as "exemplary" damages, "vindictive" dam-
ages, and "smart money." Fowler Butane Gas Co. v. Varner, 244 Miss. 130, 150, 141 So.
2d 226, 233 (1962).
12. E.g., Nicholson v. American Fire and Casualty Ins. Co., 177 So. 2d 52 (Fla.
1965); Fowler Butane Gas Co. v. Varner, 244 Miss. 130, 141 So. 2d 226 (1962); Esmond
v. Liscio, 209 Pa. Super. 200, 224 A.2d 793 (1967); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF TORTS § 2 (4th ed. 1971).
The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1977) defines punitive damages as
follows: "(1) Punitive damages are damages, other than compensatory or nominal dam-
ages, awarded against a person to punish him for his outrageous conduct and to deter him
and others from similar conduct in the future."
Punitive damages are distinguished from compensatory damages in that
"[c]ompensatory damages are such as will compensate the injured party for the injury
sustained, and nothing more; such as will simply make good or replace the loss caused by
the wrong or injury." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 352 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
13. Hanna v. Sweeney, 78 Conn. 492, 62 A. 785 (1906). The Connecticut courts also
recognize that the orthodox common law rule of punitive damages is not applicable in their
jurisdiction. Craney v. Donovan, 92 Conn. 236, 102 A. 640 (1917).
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plaintiff for mental suffering as distinguished from actual pecuni-
ary losses in Iowa, 4 Michigan,' 5 and New Hampshire. 6
The overwhelming majority of states allow punitive damages
for the express purpose of punishment and deterrence.' 7 Case law
and commentators reveal other rationales that may be found
standing alone or intertwined with various other approaches.' 8
Despite some very sharp criticism that has been levied
against punitive damages"9 the concept has persisted." A leading
treatise on torts has indicated that only four states entirely reject
the notion of punitive damages."
Liability insurance has so permeated our society that a great
amount of litigation has developed surrounding the issue of an in-
surer's liability for punitive damages assessed against its insured.
However, there has been a great division among the jurisdictions
confronted with this issue.2
The various courts that have given full consideration to the
issue have developed a two-fold analysis: (1) whether punitive
damages are covered under the policy in question; and (2)
whether public policy prohibits recovery of punitive damages from
an insurer. Some courts have circumvented part of the inquiry by
concluding that punitive damages are not covered by the policy
and hence further investigation is unnecessary. 3 An adequate un-
derstanding of the court's concerns when faced with the issue of
insurance for punitive damages may be gained from an examina-
14. Brause v. Brause, 190 Iowa 329, 177 N.W. 65 (1920).
15. Wise v. Daniel, 221 Mich. 229, 190 N.W. 746 (1922).
16. Bixby v. Dunlap, 56 N.H. 456 (1876).
17. See, e.g., Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. United States Concrete Pipe, 369 So.
2d 451, 452 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) ("[P]unitive damages are imposed against a defen-
dant as punishment to the defendant and as a deterrent to the defendant and others."). See
also 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 236 (1965).
18. One commentator has advanced four theories for the imposition of punitive dam-
ages: (1) revenge; (2) public justice; (3) compensation; and (4) punishment and deterrence.
Belli, Punitive Damages: Their History, Their Use, and Their Worth in Present-Day Soci-
ety, 49 UMKC L. REV. 1, 5-7 (1980).
Mississippi views punitive damages as a reward to the plaintiff for pursuing an action
against the wrongdoer as well as a punishment and deterrent. Snowden v. Osborne, 269 So.
2d 358 (Miss. 1972).
19. "The idea is wrong. It is a monstrous heresy. It is an unsightly and unhealthy
excrescence, deforming the symmetry and body of the law." Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 343,
382 (1873).
20. W. PROSSER, supra note 12, § 2. The orthodox view of punitive damages as a
punishment and deterrent has also been noted as an aberration in civil litigation, the pur-
pose of which is compensation to an injured party. Id.
21. Id. at 9, n.61.
22. For the most current compilation of the jurisdictions faced with this issue, see
Annot., 16 A.L.R. 4th 11 (1981).
23. Brown v. Western Casualty and Sur. Co., 484 P.2d 1252 (Colo. App. 1971).
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tion of the leading cases of Northwestern National Casualty Co.
v. McNulty24 and Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co.,2"
which represent the polar positions on the issue.
PUBLIC POLICY PROHIBITS COVERAGE: THE McNulty VIEW
In 1962, Northwestern National Casualty Co. v. McNulty
2
presented the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals with the issue of an
insurance company's liability for a judgment of punitive damages
against an insured party. The court held that "under Florida law




The plaintiff in McNulty suffered severe injuries when his car
was struck from the rear by the insured party on a Florida high-
way. The insured was intoxicated at the time of the accident. 8
The plaintiff brought suit in a Florida state court and a jury
awarded the plaintiff $37,500 in compensatory damages and
$20,000 in punitive damages. The insurance company disclaimed
any liability for punitive damages, and a garnishment action was
brought in federal district court to recover up to the policy limit of
$50,000.29 The plaintiff was granted summary judgment and the
insurance company appealed.
The Fifth Circuit found it unnecessary to pass upon contract
considerations offered by the insurer and instead focused upon
public policy considerations.3 0 The court noted that Florida fol-
lowed the orthodox view that punitive damages are imposed as a
punishment and deterrent3 l and found very strong public policy
reasons for preventing irresponsible drivers from escaping punish-
ment through insurance. 2 The court sympathized with the posi-
tion of the injured plaintiff but considered the public interest in
24. 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962).
25. 214 Tenn. 639, 383 S.W.2d 1 (1964).
26. 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962).
27. Id. at 433. The court noted the various meanings assigned to "punitive damages"
and limited their holding to situations where they are "awarded with a view to punish the
defendant for irresponsible conduct and to deter the defendant and others from similar
misconduct." Id. at 442.
28. Id. at 433.
29. Id. The policy provided: "To pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the
insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of: 'A. bodily injury,
sickness or disease, including death resulting therefrom' . Id.
30. Id. at 434.
31. Id. at 435.
32. Id. at 441. "Where a person is able to insure himself against punishment he
gains a freedom of misconduct inconsistent with the establishment of sanctions against
such misconduct." Id. at 440.
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punishing wrongdoers and deterring others from similar conduct
more important. 33
The essence of the McNulty holding, which was later adopted
by the Florida courts as the law of the jurisdiction,34 and by other
jurisdictions by virtue of its persuasiveness, can be summarized in
the following excerpt from the opinion:
If that person were permitted to shift the burden to an insurance
company, punitive damages would serve no useful purpose. Such
damages do not compensate the plaintiff for his injury, since com-
pensatory damages already have made the plaintiff whole. And there
is no point in punishing the insurance company; it has done no
wrong.36
PUBLIC POLICY DOES NOT PROHIBIT COVERAGE: THE Lazenby
VIEW
Two years after McNulty, the Tennessee Supreme Court had
opportunity to rule on a similar situation. In Lazenby v. Universal
Underwriters Insurance Co.,3" the plaintiff was awarded compen-
satory and punitive damages as a result of injuries arising from
the negligent operation of an automobile by the insured who was
intoxicated at the time. The insurance company agreed to pay the
compensatory damages but claimed that punitive damages were
not covered by the contract.17 The court rejected the insurance
company's contract argument38  and held it liable for the full
amount of the judgment.
3 9
The public policy argument of McNulty was not persuasive
with the Tennessee Supreme Court although Tennessee, like Flor-
ida, views punitive damages as a punishment and deterrent.' 0
"Public policy is practically synonymous with public good and un-
33. Id. at 442.
34. E.g., Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. United States Concrete Pipe Co., 369 So.
2d 451 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
35. 307 F.2d at 440. Accord, e.g., Gleason v. Fryer, 30 Colo. App. 106, 491 P.2d 85
(1971); Nicholson v. American Fire and Casualty Ins. Co., 177 So. 2d 52 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1965).
36. 214 Tenn. 639, 383 S.W.2d 1 (1964).
37. The policy provided: "To pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured
shall become legally obligated to pay as damages . I..." id. at 642, 383 S.W.2d at 2.
38. The court stated: "[w]e think the average policy holder reading this language
would expect to be protected against all claims, not intentionally inflicted." Id. at 648, 383
S.W.2d at 5. See infra notes 50-54 and accompanying text. See also Price v. Hartford Acc.
and Indem. Co., 108 Ariz. 485, 502 P.2d 522 (1972).
39. 214 Tenn. at 647, 383 S.W.2d at 4-5.
40. Id. at 646, 383 S.W.2d at 4.
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less the private contract is in terms of such a character as to tend
to harm or injure the public good . . . it is not violative of public
policy nor void on that account."4 The court was influenced in its
public policy determination by the questionable result of denying
recovery of punitive damages from an insurer.
This State, in regard to the proper operation of motor vehicles, has a
great many detailed criminal sanctions, which apparently have not
deterred this slaughter on our highways and streets. Then to say the
closing of the insurance market, in the payment of punitive dam-
ages, would act to deter guilty drivers would in our opinion contain
some matter of speculation. 2
ANALYSIS
As noted earlier, the Mississippi Supreme Court did not give
any rationale for its holding in Frith, only stating that it was the
"better reasoned view."' 43 One commentator has noted that the
foundation for the decision might be found in the fact that Missis-
sippi views punitive damages as both a reward to the plaintiff for
pursuing the action and as a punishment of and deterrent to the
defendant." While it is true that the McNulty approach would
require additional analysis under Mississippi case law, which al-
lows punitive damages for reasons other than punishment and de-
terrence, the simple extension of the principle would not require
great effort.45
Frith may also be seen as a statement of the judicial attitude
toward declaring private contracts void on public policy grounds. 4"
Looking at Frith as a statement about the propriety of partially
41. Id. at 648, 383 S.W.2d at 5.
42. Id. But see American Sur. Co. of New York v. Gold, 375 F.2d 523 (10th Cir.
1966).
[W]e may as well say criminal sanctions serve no useful purpose just because
they are constantly violated. The question is not so much the efficacy of the
policy underlying punitive damages; rather it is a question of the implemen-
tation of that policy. Permitting the penalty for the misdeed to be levied on
one other than he [sic] who committed it cannot possibly implement the
policy.
Id. at 527.
43. Frith, 394 So. 2d at 868.
44. Supreme Court Review, Payment of a Tortfeasor's Punitive Damages by His
Insurance Company, 52 Miss. L. J. 445, 447 (1982).
45. Id. McNulty was limited to situations where punitive damages were awarded for
punishment and deterrence. McNulty, 307 F.2d at 442.
46. See generally 17 AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 178 (1964).
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voiding a private contract by judicial action, it must first be
remembered that the courts are dealing with a contract. 7 This
observation may seem quite unnecessary, but the vast majority of
the literature written about the insurability of punitive damages
focuses on the public policy theme with very little emphasis on
contract considerations.
The emphasis on public policy appears to be a direct result of
stare decisis. As soon as McNulty was decided, the stage was set.
When the insurability issue arose in another court, McNulty
would inevitably be cited as persuasive authority, thereby en-
gendering yet another judicial excursion into the public policy
realm as espoused in McNulty. The courts felt compelled either to
accept or explain away the conclusions of McNulty.
The court in McNulty found it unnecessary to pass on con-
tract arguments presented by the insurer, stating that should a
policy provide specifically for coverage of punitive damages "it
would contravene public policy."48 Specific case law in Mississippi
may well require a contract analysis prior to considering public
policy. 9 The public policy questions would be a part of the con-
tract question - a balance between the right to contract and pub-
lic policy considerations.
There is some disagreement on the threshold matter of
whether punitive damages are included under the language of the
contract.50 In a contract setting, the doctrine of contra profer-
entem (ambiguous terms are to be construed against the party
who selected the language)51 would probably place punitive dam-
ages within the scope of the policy language.5
Mississippi case law specifically dealing with insurance poli-
47. "The insurance contract in the case at bar is a private contract . . . to hold
assured, as a matter of public policy, is not protected by the policy cn a claim for punitive
damages would have the effect to partially void the contract." Lazenby, 383 S.W.2d at 5.
48. 307 F.2d at 434.
49. See infra notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
50. Compare Brown v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 484 P.2d 1252 (Colo. Ct. App.
1971) and Lazenby, supra note 38 (coverage denied) with Southern Farm Bureau Ins. Co.
v. Daniel, 246 Ark. 849, 440 S.W.2d 582 (1969) (coverage allowed). See generally
Sprentall, Insurance Coverage of Punitive Damages, 84 DICK. L. REV. 221, 223-27 (1980).
51. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 296 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
52. One insurance treatise has suggested that courts should not aid insurers that do
not insert an exclusion clause. 6B APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE (Buckley
ed.) § 4312 (1979). There does not appear to be any impediment to prevent an insurer
from excluding punitive damages from the policy. See Comment, The Exclusion Clause: A
Simple and Genuine Solution to the Insurance for Punitive Damages Controversy, 12
U.S.F.L. REV. 743 (1978).
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cies is replete with examples. 3 "[W]here a policy of insurance is
prepared by the insurance company, its terms must be considered
most favorably toward the insured . . . provisions of doubtful
meaning must be construed most strongly toward liability.
'54
The Mississippi courts have recognized their duty and power
to declare contracts void when made contrary to law or public pol-
icy, 55 but they have also recognized that "[t]he right to contract
and have contracts enforced is a basic one guaranteed by the Con-
stitutions. The function of the courts is to enforce contracts rather
than enable parties to escape their obligation upon the pretext of
public policy." 6 Courts seem to favor the rights of parties to
freely contract and are averse to holding contracts void on public
policy absent a clear showing of illegality. 51 The Mississippi court
has also noted the invasive nature of voiding contracts on public
policy grounds.58
A question that is often overlooked surrounds the source of
public policy.59 The holding in Frith may be more clearly under-
stood when it is seen that Mississippi courts first look for enuncia-
tions of public policy in the constitutions and statutes before look-
ing to judicial decisions."0 The Mississippi Supreme Court may
have been heavily persuaded by the fact that when the Legislature
enumerated what could not be covered by a motor vehicle liability
policy, punitive damages were not mentioned. By implication it
appears that punitive damages may be covered by a motor vehicle
liability policy. The actual truth may be that the Legislature
never even thought about punitive damages, but if so, the analysis
goes back to a balancing approach between the sanctity of con-
tract rights and public policy. In 1904, the Mississippi Supreme
Court expressed the judicial attitude toward the sanctity of con-
tract when it stated "contracts are not in violation of the public
policy . . . unless prohibited by express terms or the fair implica-
53. See, e.g., Bellefonte Ins. Co. v. Griffin, 358 So. 2d 387 (Miss. 1978); State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 233 So. 2d 805 (Miss. 1970) (ambiguous terms are con-
strued against the drafter).
54. Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Broadus, 237 Miss. 387, 388, 115 So. 2d 130,
132 (1959) (emphasis added).
55. Smith v. Simon, 224 So. 2d 565, 566 (Miss. 1969).
56. Id. (emphasis added).
57. National Mill Supply Co. v. State, 211 Ind. 243, 6 N.E.2d 543 (1937); Wallehan
v. Hughs, 196 Va. 117, 82 S.E.2d 553 (1954); 17 AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 178 (1964).
58. State v. Edward Hines Lumber Co., 150 Miss. 1, 48, 115 So. 598, 605 (1928).
59. "Public policy" does not carry a fixed meaning and escapes a clear definition and
rigid rule. 17 AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 175 (1964).
60. 150 Miss. at 48, 115 So. at 605.
61. Miss. CODE ANN. § 63-15-43(5) (Supp. 1982).
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tion of a statute, or condemned by some decision of the courts
construing the subject matter."62
CONCLUSION
In summary, Anthony v. Frith will in all likelihood be cited
by future courts as authority for the proposition that punitive
damages may be recovered from an insurer, but nothing more.
Since the issue was first raised in a court of law, the debate over
public policy has continued. It is quite possible that the original
seed of controversy was sowed by an ingenious (or desperate) de-
fense attorney who realized he had a weak contract argument.
The result of the public policy emphasis is to place otherwise all-
important contract issues in a role of secondary importance.
Beyond all of the literature written in this area it appears
that except for the cases of first impression the point is probably
moot in practical application.6" Once a jurisdiction has set the
ground rules counsel for either side will know how to pro-
ceed-thus the game will continue. Although there are many in-
teresting legal doctrines involved in this area, in most instances
homage will continue to be paid to "public policy" and the prior
decisions in this area will be viewed as mere marks to be tallied on
opposite sides of a ledger sheet.
Robert C. Boyd
62. Orrell v. Bay Mfg. Co., 83 Miss. 800, 824, 36 So. 561, 564 (1904). See also
Commonwealth v. Hall, 291 Pa. 341, 140 A. 626 (1928) (It is the domain of the legislature
to define what agreements and acts contravene public policy). But see Woodson v. Hopkins,
85 Miss. 171, 181, 37 So. 1000, 1001 (1905) ("[Tlhe courts should not hesitate to declare
a contract illegal merely because no statute or precedent prohibiting it can be found.").
63. See the general discussion found at note 52 supra.
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